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ABSTRACT 
Our present survey focuses on the analysis of counter-terrorism instruments in the Israeli system, 
taking into account the composite approach to the phenomenon adopted by it. The most important 
decisions of the Supreme Court are examined, in particular, on the problem of balancing security 
with human rights, through an analysis of jurisprudence concerning targeted killings, presumptions 
of danger and methods of interrogation. 
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Resumo 
Nossa pesquisa atual enfoca a análise de instrumentos de combate ao terrorismo no sistema 
israelense, levando em conta a abordagem composta do fenômeno adotado por ela. As decisões 
mais importantes da Suprema Corte são examinadas, em particular, sobre o problema de equilibrar 
a segurança com os direitos humanos, por meio de uma análise da jurisprudência sobre 
assassinatos seletivos, presunções de perigo e métodos de interrogatório. 
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INTRODUCTION. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN THE STATE OF 
ISRAEL 
 
In the experience of the State of Israel the alarm connected to terrorism is in fact well 
rooted in the history of the country, given that the first attacks date back to the period of the 
British mandate. Contrary to what might appear, they were not perpetrated only by organized 
Arab-Palestinian groups, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, but they were often due to activists of 
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Jewish and criminal extremist associations. The murder of Prime Minister Rabin, which took 
place in 1995 at the hands of a Jew, is remembered as the first case in history in which the 
judiciary did not qualify as a common murder but also due to the pressure of the Arab 
population, like a real terrorist act. In this way it was symbolically marked the overcoming of 
that practice which excluded upstream the terrorist nature of the crime, if it was committed by a 
Jew, since in such hypotheses it was preferred to consider the agent as an imputable. 
(AURIEL, BEAUD, WELLMAN, 2018) 
However, this decision did not mark a real overcoming of the discriminatory prejudice 
affecting the Palestinian population. Even today, in fact, the conduct that abstractly could be 
subsumed in the crime of terrorism, or otherwise considered as security offenses, if put in place 
by Jewish settlers against the residents of the occupied territories, are qualified "price tag 
attacks" (D. BYMAN-N. SACHS, 2012; COHEN, 2014; PANEPINTO, 2016; KEARNEY, 2017; 
WATERROW, J. SCHUMACHER, 2018). The main relapse of this orientation is to punish acts 
with the application of common crimes, such as murder, injury and damage, and therefore with 
penalties significantly lower than those foreseen for terrorist offenses. 
The only change that occurred in June 2013 touched only the powers of investigation, 
which were expanded thanks to the inclusion of Jewish extremist groups in the list of criminal 
associations, thus allowing to exploit the most elastic forecasts of the defense (emergency) 
regulations of 1945. The measures of negative prevention of terrorism are regulated within the 
latter and are accompanied, in terms of substantive criminal law, by the cases included in the 
integrated prevention of terrorism ordinance of 1948, in relation to the definition of "terrorist 
organization", from the predictions of the "financing terror prohibition law 5765-2005". (KLEIN, 
2005/2006) 
 
1.THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ORDINANCE 
 
The prevention of terrorism ordinance (PTO) (LENNON, 2015) was adopted by the 
government in response to the murder of count Bernadotte but, over the years, has lost its 
character of emergency regulation to become a real ordinary employee law, or in force as long 
as the declaration of the state of emergency persists national. Since the latter has ceased to 
exist, subject to changes by the legislator, the cases to be recalled will be the general ones of 
articles from 145 to 149 of the Israeli criminal code (FRIEDMANN, 2012), which punish a wide 
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range of conduct of participation and support to criminal associations, not of a terrorist nature. 
The provisions of the ordinance have a strong political matrix, albeit attenuated by the 
reform interventions of 1980, 1986 and finally of 1993, since the ratio was notably to affect not 
only the conduct of management and participation in the terrorist group, but also, and above 
all, those of support, aiding and propaganda. The latter pose many problems if balanced with 
freedom of expression, as they introduce the possibility of inaugurating seasons of strong 
political repression, especially against those who struggle for self-determination or for 
overcoming religious dogmas that still afflict today the Israeli legal system (JABAREEN, 2008; 
RUBINSTEIN, 2010, OSTOJIC, 2014; FRIEDMANN, 2012). 
Returning to the provisions of the 1948 ordinance, it is noted that the Israeli legislator 
opted for the adoption of a differentiated sanction regime, depending on the role played by the 
single agent within the criminal organization (MachsomWatch, Guilty: Membership and Activity 
in Unlawful Association. Military Courts, 2008, pp. 12ss). 
Support means: the publication of words of sympathy or encouragement, or praise, for 
the commission of acts of violence aimed at causing death or injury to persons (letter a); the 
publication of words of sympathy, or appeals to obtain aid in support of the terrorist group 
(letter b); the possession of propaganda material (letter c); the donation of money for his 
benefit (letter d); the provision of places that can serve as a deposit, meeting point or group 
operating base (letter e); the provision of articles that could be used by the association, or one 
of its members, to commit a terrorist act (letter f); to maintain conduct that denotes adherence 
to a terrorist group, in a public place, or in a way that allows people in a public place to see or 
hear such acts, which may be represented by waving a flag or showing a symbol or slogan or 
any other conduct suitable to make manifest the identification of the subject with the terrorist 
group (letter g/amendment according to the 1980 ordinance). 
It is therefore noted that this ordinance has as its main purpose the sanctioning and 
prevention of "para-terrorist" activities, or conduct of political activism in favor of the cause 
pursued by the groups included, on the initiative of the government, in the blacklist of terrorist 
organizations. However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the courts of merit has 
always been careful to outline the boundaries between freedom of thought and forbidden 
propaganda, providing a restrictive interpretation of the provisions of art. 4. An example of this 
is the Jbarin case (Cr.F.H., 8613/96, Jbarin v. The State of Israel, P.D. 54(5) 193), which has 
been a defendant pursuant to art. 4 lett. a) an Arab-Israeli journalist who, in 1991, had 
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published an article in which he claimed that every time he threw a stone, a feeling of national 
pride grew in his mind, and that the launch of a molotov allowed him to find his own identity 
and dignity. After the sentence at first instance, an appeal was made to the Supreme Court, to 
clarify whether, in the absence of a textual appeal, the words of incitement or support should 
be causally connected to the activities of a terrorist group. The judges declared this connection 
necessary, configuring it as an implicit element of this case, since the offense could not be 
configured if the instigation to commit acts of violence is destined to individuals acting as 
individuals and not as affiliates of a criminal association (GONTOVNIK, 2004). 
It is interesting to point out that on the same day the Supreme Court decided on the 
Banjamin Kahane case (C.F.H., 1789/98, State of Israel v. Benjamin Kahane, P.D. 54 (5) 145), 
accused of the crime of "sediction", expected and regulated by sect. 133-136 of the Israeli 
penal code, for having published an article in which he instigated the bombing of an Arab 
village in response to some terrorist attacks against the Jewish population. The conduct, as we 
can see, is very similar to that described in art. 4 PTO and punishes, with the fixed sentence of 
five years imprisonment, who plans or commits a subversive act, or whoever imports, 
publishes, prints or otherwise reproduces material of this nature. However, section 135 of the 
criminal code (FRIEDMANN, 2014),  for the purpose of contesting this hypothesis of crime, 
provides for the necessary existence of two preliminary conditions: 1) the prior authorization to 
proceed by the attorney general; 2) that no more than one year has passed since the 
commission has been committed. The Supreme Court declared the defendant guilty of the 
crime ascribed, taking the opportunity to clarify that the presence of the two requirements just 
mentioned is to be considered adequate and sufficient to prevent abuse or excessive 
restrictions on freedom of expression, which is why he did not recognize the need to proceed 
with a reformulation of the non code case, contrary to what is found in relation to art. 4 PTO. 
(HILL-CAWTHORNE, 2014, BARAK-EREZ, SCHARIA, 2011). 
 
2.THE DEFENSE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS OF 1945 
 
The framework to combat terrorism is made more effective through the prevention 
measures included in the defense (emergency) regulations, aimed at maintaining public order 
and applicable both in the State of Israel and within the occupied territories. (CAIANIELLO, 
CORRADO, 2013) 
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The measures that are encoded in it have been adopted with the explicit aim of 
suppressing or preventing the revolts of the population against the government and introducing 
into the system of fighting terrorism administrative instruments which, on the one hand, risk 
becoming real sanctions. retroactive penalties and, on the other hand, are often applied 
indiscriminately, not for general-preventive purposes, but rather as systems of recognition of 
collective responsibility. This legislation also provides the legal basis for the creation of military 
courts, which operate above all in zone C, applying less secure rules of procedure and not 
always providing guarantees for the right to appeal. 
Section 124, for example, allows military commanders and general executive to restrict 
the freedom of movement of the population, requiring not abandoning their home or a certain 
area at particular times of the day, unless they are equipped with appropriate written 
authorization (H.C. 477/91, Israeli-Palestinian Doctors Society v. Minister of Defense, 45(2) 
P.D. 832) 
These precautions are aimed at avoiding collective punishment of the population and 
making this measure exceptional, even without denying its great importance for the restoration 
of safety, especially in relation to the possibility of having easier access to the houses where it 
is suspected to find hidden terrorists or weapons. (GROSS, 2002; GROSS, 2006) 
The supreme judges then intervened in the matter of inspections and searches in the 
occupied territories, in order to definitively prohibit the "early warning procedure", which 
consisted of using protected civilians as human shields in military operations conducted in 
small villages (OTTO, 2004; LACHENMANN, WOLFRUN, 2018; SHERESHEVSKY, 2018; 
BENVENISTI, 2012) 
They were required, even through the use of physical and moral coercion, to go to the 
place where the wanted person was to push him to surrender, or to enter places where they 
thought they had been armed with explosives. The court, after taking note of the effort of the 
regularization government, the procedure, through the codification of rules of engagement for 
the members of IDF, has in any case excluded the proportionality of this practice, which 
exposed to those who, in the light of of the fourth Geneva convention, should have been given 
enhanced protection. (CASSESE, 1984; GREENWOOD, 1991) 
In particular, the motivation was based essentially on four topics: 1) the civilian 
population can not be used to fulfill military needs; 2) the obligation to remove the civilian 
population from areas where military activities are taking place is imperative; 3) it is impossible 
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to consider the consent given by a civilian free of defects, taking into account the psychological 
pressure to which he is subject; 4) it is not possible to predict ex ante the degree of danger to 
which the intermediary is exposed, as well as the indirect effect that early warning regulation 
could cause. In fact, one could introduce a presumption such that this practice would be 
considered prima facie always licit, since it is bound to written engagement rules (FABBRINI, 
JACKSON, 2016; SAPIR, BARAK-EREZ, BARAK, 2014; SCHARIA, 2015; SFARD, 2018). 
The preventive measures that directly affect freedom of movement are also those 
relating to the closure of access points to the State of Israel from the territories of the West 
Bank and the recognition of some places such as "closed military areas". They bring to the 
attention the difficult relationship between preventive measures and collective responsibility: 
although these decisions, in light of the forecasts of the sect. 122 and 125 of the DERs, can be 
assumed by the executive, only if considered necessary for security and public order needs, 
they, starting above all from the second Intifada, have assumed the role of real means of 
indiscriminate control of the population. The ratio linked to the danger of allowing potential 
terrorists to enter the national territory has in fact been transformed into a widespread 
presumption of danger, linked to the ethnicity or place of origin, which introduces a clear 
reversal of the burden of proof. In fact, what is tested on a case-by-case basis is not the 
danger of the individual, but rather its non-dangerousness, an essential condition for the 
granting of transit permits from one place to another. 
In relation to these measures, the Supreme Court has adopted an approach more in line 
with the supposed continuous security needs in the occupied territories, refraining from 
analyzing the factual and evaluative assumptions to support their adoption and limiting itself 
simply to reaffirming the need to observe the criteria of proportionality and reasonableness. 
 
3.DEPORTATIONS: SECTION 112, DEFENSE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS 
 
The legal basis for deportations carried out by the Israeli army must be seen in sect. 112 
DER, according to which a regional commander has the power to issue a deportation order 
against any person in occupied territory. The use of this measure can not be arbitrary, but must 
meet the requirements set forth in section 108 DER, or guarantee the security and 
maintenance of public order, through the suppression of rebellions or riots. The executive 
procedure is therefore entirely remitted to the decisions of the military authorities that can be 
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appealed before an advisory committee, composed of army officers and only in a possible way 
before the high court of justice. 
Despite the prediction of the 49th, fourth Geneva convention, which imposes the 
prohibition of mass deportations, the Supreme Court immediately supported the legitimacy of 
the sect's prediction. 112 DER, since it refers only to individual orders. Its ratio, in fact, was 
considered quite different from that which supported the deportations that were witnessed 
during the Second World War, intervened on the basis of pretentious political motives that 
disguised the intent to exterminate a people. 
In the opinion of the judges, the purpose of art. 49 is not to weaken the obligation to 
protect the state against its own citizens. Paragraph 2 of the same article, in fact, puts an 
exception to the prohibition of deportations if the decision is taken for security reasons. The 
doctrine also noted that, if art. 147 of the same Convention recognizes the "illicit deportations" 
as serious violations of the humanitarian law there codified, reasoning a contrariis, we can only 
conclude that there are legitimate (MORGAN, 1988; DAYANIM, 1994; GROSS, 2003). 
From this it follows that the reference made by these provisions to the term "protected 
person" -defined by art. 4 (CROWE, WESTON-SCEUBER, 2013; GREENWOOD, 2008)-cannot 
in any way refer to terrorists, irregular immigrants or spies simply because they "are physically 
located on the territory of a State party to the conflict or the occupying power, not being citizens 
(…)". (ALLISON, 1994) 
These positions were taken on the occasion of one of the most famous deportations 
cases in Israeli history, involving 415 individuals belonging to Hamas and Islamic jihad 
organizations (ALLISON, 1994), coercively transferred to Lebanon on the basis of two orders, 
n. 1381 and the n. 1986 of 1992, adopted by the military commanders of Judea and Samaria 
and the Gaza Strip. Both imposed immediate deportation for security reasons, excluding the 
right to appeal against the measure, although it was normally recognized to the recipients of 
the measure, before its execution. 
The Supreme Court censured this last provision, underlining that under no 
circumstances could an emergency regulation impose exemptions on fundamental principles 
that are based on natural law, such as the right to appeal against a provision that affects the 
rights of the individual, or the right to obtain effective judicial protection, since in this case the 
new rule would not be exceptional and dependent on contingent elements, but a real 
modification of the legal system, linked to the temporal validity of the provision in which it is 
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inserted, and not to its nature. 
In light of these considerations, the two military orders were declared void, but this 
invalidity did not go to undermine that of the individual deportation orders. The court, in fact, 
recognized that in exceptional cases and for reasons of security, it was permissible to grant the 
right to appeal after the execution, but refrained from delineating what could be the 
"exceptional situations" that allow such an exception. In the present case, in fact, it was limited 
to requiring the enforcement authorities to allow the appellants to appeal to the advisory 
committee, after the execution of the measure, guaranteeing the deportee, as far as possible, 
to appear personally before the college. (COHEN, COHEN, 2013; SANDBERG, 2013) 
It is important to underline that the arguments sustained by the State of Israel regarding 
the legitimacy of the prediction of sect's 112 DER, on the contrary, they have been widely 
criticized by the United Nations Security Council. In Recommendation 799/1992 (KRETZMER, 
2012) the "mass deportation" carried out by the Israeli authorities was condemned, as it was 
carried out in serious violation of the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and the provisions of 
articles 49-in relation to the irrelevance of the reasons, for the prohibition of deportation 
referred to in the first paragraph and the absence of imperative military reasons, to activate the 
derogation of paragraph two-and 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention. (KACZOROWSKA-
IRELAND, 2015) 
These considerations, however, did not lead to a revision of the orientation of the 
Supreme Court, but led the doctrine to propose an increase in the guarantees to be recognized 
to the individual, through a change of perspective: given the numerous implications on 
fundamental rights that lead with if the deportations were made, it was suggested to move from 
an administrative procedure to a real judicial process which, taking into account their general-
preventive nature, would require a judge to decide on their application. Anchoring the 
application to a conviction for terrorist acts, pronounced according to the evidential standard of 
beyond reasonable doubt (BASH, GINBAR, FELNER, 1993), would also avoid the deportation 
of subjects often colluding, but not real competitors, who share the reasons for the act, but do 
not provide causally relevant aid. 
 
4.THE DEMOLITION OF HOUSES: SECTION 119 OF DEFENSE (EMERGENCY) 
REGULATIONS 
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The demolition of houses is among the most controversial administrative measures 
used in the prevention of terrorism. It is regulated in sect. 119 of the defense (emergency) 
regulations, which establishes that a military commander may, by his own order, confiscate 
houses, structures or land in which he has reason to suspect that there are held weapons, 
explosives or grenades, or that from there they are launched. He can also confiscate houses 
located in any city, district or village where they live subjects that he considers responsible for 
having committed, attempted, or only favored crimes against security, provided for in DER or in 
any case within the jurisdiction of the military courts. When confiscation proceeds, the 
commander can subsequently order its total or partial destruction. Despite the textual data, 
depending on the circumstances of the concrete case, the destruction can be replaced by the 
less incisive measure of the sealing of the seals. 
Section 119, DER is mainly applied in the occupied territories and does not depend on a 
conviction for terrorist offenses, it is not a collective penalty, but a general-preventive measure 
left to the discretion of the executive and used as a deterrent, especially in against the 
kamikaze (WALTER, VÖNEKY, RÖBEN, 2004). 
Art. 53 of the fourth Geneva convention, in parallel, prohibits the destruction of assets of 
the State or of individuals, if not absolutely necessary by military operations, as well as 
imposing punitive sanctions on a person for crimes not personally committed by him. The 
Israeli judges took into account the regulatory framework outlined above, claiming that the 
demolition is a form of "effective military reaction" (SCHMITT, 2017; CHAPHAM, GAETA, 
SASSÓLI, 2015), necessary as a deterrent, but forgot that the dictate of art. 53, from the last 
mentioned, refers to something totally different. On the one hand, in fact, there is a substantial 
difference between "military operations" and "interventions aimed at maintaining security" and, 
on the other hand, the declared general-preventive nature of the measure, to no relevance for 
the purpose of compliance required requirement of "absolute necessity" (WELCHMAN, 1993; 
GROSS, 2002). 
Furthermore, arguing that the demolition aims to push potential suicide bombers to 
desist from their actions, it only serves to recall one of the aims of the sentence, which would 
make the measure a criminal sanction, applied by an administrative body, rather than by a 
court, in the absence of the typical guarantees of criminal law. These include the right of 
defense, the right to be notified-as soon as possible-the charges against you, as well as the 
right to be tried by a third and impartial tribunal. In other words, it has been established that the 
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nature of the sanction should not be determined by that of the state body appointed to apply it 
but, on the contrary, that it is the nature of the body that must be determined by the nature of 
the sanction. 
An element is nevertheless peaceful, that is the possibility of proceeding according to 
sect. 119 DER even in the absence of a conviction, especially since the order can also be 
issued following a suicide attack, or before the formal challenge of a detailed accusation 
(RONEN, 2013). 
The seriousness of the committed fact is therefore a parameter alone sufficient to make 
the measure of prevention applicable, even against those who cohabitated with the terrorist or 
suspect that. On this point, however, the judges have given a very extensive interpretation of 
the term "inhabitants", recognizing even those who do not reside in a house in a habitual way 
and also defining the demolition of the family home, where the person responsible for a violent 
crime previously resided (HARPAZ, 2015; FARELL, 2003). 
The jurisprudence considers the repercussions on the life of the family members an 
element that is easily justifiable and proportionate to the needs of contrasting the terrorist 
phenomenon, since the risk of being deprived of their own home should push the family 
members of those who are planning an attack on the complaint. In such cases, the prediction 
of the sect 95 of the penal code, which excludes the punishment of relatives who do not take 
action to prevent the crime of future commission would be irrelevant. 
A limitation to the discretion of the executive, however, is represented by the 
introduction of the obligation to guarantee the right to appeal against the demolition order, as a 
necessary condition to execute it, to be exercised before the military commander who issued it, 
and subsequently before to the Supreme Court, thus establishing a procedure of control, 
including jurisdiction, on its validity (HCJ, 2977/02, Adallah v. IDF Commander in Judea and 
Samaria, not published). The right to appeal can however be suspended in "severe and 
exceptional cases", which the judges have identified with reference to the seriousness and 
danger of the action committed and recalling, by way of example, the launch of incendiary 
bottles and violent actions that have caused death or serious injury to civilians. 
As to reasonableness, it has been specified that the judge, even if he does not have to 
substitute his own discretion for that of military experts, must check the legitimacy by asking 
whether, given the concrete circumstances, an average military commander would have acted 
in the same way. Regarding the principle of proportion, in addition to taking into account the 
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gravity of the fact and the circumstances in which it was committed, it was imposed on military 
commanders to weigh the degree of involvement of roommates (even if members of the family) 
and possible repercussions on adjacent buildings. 
However, what has not yet been clarified by the court is "the evidentiary standard" that 
must be observed. The legitimacy of the prediction of sect. 119 DER, consider that a burden of 
proof is necessary that is halfway between that required by civil law and that of criminal law: 
the administrative authority should act, in fact, only in the presence of "clear and convincing 
evidences", in relation to the responsibility of the recipient of the measure, for the committed 
crime (GROSS, 2001). 
 
5.THE ALIGNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 
 
The legislative plan to combat terrorism is resolved, on the one hand, into a dynamic or 
action dimension, characterized by the reference to the law of war and, on the other hand, in a 
static dimension, characterized by the use of instruments of an administrative nature and 
criminal law. The picture that is thus emerging reflects the theory that terrorism is not a crime 
but a different dimension of it, a higher and more dangerous version of crime, a sort of super-
crime that must incorporate some of the characteristics of the war. 
Starting from the outbreak of the second Intifada (2000), the intensity of the clashes 
between the Israeli army and the Palestinian population has reached alarming levels, mainly 
due to a change in the strategy of the terrorist organizations, which increasingly exploited the 
crowds of civilians to hide suicide bombers. From that moment, in fact, the government 
decided to change its official position on the nature of the attacks against the State of Israel by 
organized Palestinian groups, calling them "armed attacks", thanks to the reference to the 
"accumulation doctrine". In particular, in the position paper presented in 2001 at the Sharm El 
Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (the Mitchell Commission), the Israeli authorities used the term 
"armed conflict short of war". 
In 2002, this change of perspective also resulted in the Supreme Court's endorsement, 
which, aligning itself with the demands of the executive, argued as follows: "Israel finds itself in 
the middle of the difficult battle against a furious wave of terrorism. Israel is exercising its right 
of self defense. See the Charter of the United Nations, art. 51M (WELLER, 2015). This combat 
is not taking place in a normative void. It is being carried out according to the rules of 
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international law, which provide principles and rules for combat activity (HCJ 3451/02, Almandi 
v Minister of Defense, par. 9. WEILL, 2014). In the subsequent Ajuri v. IDF Commander 
sentence in West Bank (HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri et al., v. IDF commander in the West Bank) the 
court of justice resorted to the term "armed struggle", while only in 2004, with the Beit Sourik 
Village Council v. The Government of Israel sentence (HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourit Village Council 
v. The Govern of the Israel), was used the term "armed conflict", thus recognizing the an 
express authorization to operate in the paradigm of war law (RAGUAN, 2010, MCMAHON, 
2010; MARGALIT, 2018; MAHLER, 2016). 
It is no coincidence that the Israeli government has insisted that a definition of terrorism 
be reached as a new type of armed conflict (VAN DER WILT, 2012; METTRAUX, 2009, 
KRESS, 2010; PAULUS, 2009, AKANDE, 2012; CORN, 2015, GASSER, 2013) since in this 
way the state has been able to make use of the clause in art. 51 of the Charter of the UN 
(VENTURA, 2018), positioning itself in line with developments in the fight against terrorism in 
the international community. In fact, this mechanism allows the executive to exploit the ius ad 
bellum first and jus in bellum then, showing how, in this country, national security is considered 
a primary collective good and therefore tends to prevail in balancing with some fundamental 
rights (GROSS, 2005. Terrorism thus covers the "gray zone" between crime and war, since its 
actors can be placed in a median category, between a conventional state and the military 
forces that are the recipients of the provisions of the international conventions (FLETCHER, 
2006). Deciding to qualify terrorism as an act of war does not therefore lead to marginal 
consequences or simple labeling. Just think of the effects of creating a new category of 
fighters, the unlawful combatants, who have denied the guarantees of prisoners of war, and in 
some cases even the minimum standards of humanitarian law provided for by art. 3 common to 
the fourth Geneva Conventions, and from art. 75 of the first additional protocol, entitled 
"fundamental guarantees". 
The major problem related to the movement in terms of war law, in fact, concerns the 
risk of creating a permanent state of exception, capable of affecting in a definite way on the 
legal system, creating gray areas that risk escaping the limits imposed by the rule of law and 
thus fall into a space free by law, since it is regulated only by political utilitarianism. 
 
6.TERRORISM AND LEGITIMATE PASSIVE DEFENSE: THE SECURITY BARRIER 
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On July 23, 2001, the Israeli government adopted a recommendation to publicize the 
decision to build a security fence to defend the country from attacks from the Palestinian 
territories and to prevent suicide terrorists from infiltrating the Israeli population. 
However, the security fence was not built along the green-line. The executive included 
in the project also part of the territory of West Bank, drawing the line of the wall so as to be 
able to also understand the Jewish settlements in Palestine. 
The population residing in the occupied territories saw themselves deprived of their land 
(due to confiscation due to security needs) and limited in their freedom of movement, not being 
able to access the land to be cultivated, to other Arab villages, to water sources, to schools and 
hospitals, if not provided with appropriate permits. The effects of the construction of the wall, in 
fact, fell mainly on the Palestinians, whose economy (already weak) almost suffered a collapse. 
The grievances of the latter led to the submission of an appeal to the Supreme Court, which 
pronounced on June 30, 2004, ten days before the publication of the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) which, at the request of the UN General Assembly, decided 
on the same question. 
It is curious to note how the two courts, while deciding on the same facts and with 
reference to the same provisions of international law, have reached profoundly different 
conclusions. ICJ concluded that the security fence was illegitimate, as it was erected in 
violation of the provisions of the Hague Convention and of the IV Geneva convention, which 
prevent the occupying power from confiscating land and developing works or infrastructures on 
the occupied territories, unless activities are not dictated by impelling military needs or aimed at 
protecting the local population (CHAPHAM, GAETA,  SASSÓLI, 2015). In no case, in fact, the 
military commanders competent to administer the territory can make decisions based on 
political or socio-economic needs of the belonging state. 
The Court found the national security needs of the state of Israel to be unfounded and 
rejected the reference to art. 51 of the Charter of the UN (VENTURA, 2018): the threat posed 
by the Israeli government could not be considered "external", as envisaged by the 
aforementioned resolutions of 1368 and 1373 (2001), since it came from an area under its full 
control. It also noted that serious violations of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian 
population, as they could not be justified by military imperatives or the need to maintain public 
order, thus made the Israeli government's decision an attempt to annex de facto part of the 
territories subject to occupation war (GROSS, 2017). 
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For this reason and given the clear correlation between the route of the wall and the 
location of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, the judges established that the state 
of Israel had acted for purely political purposes, in violation of international law. The Israeli 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, in the famous Beit Sourik Village Council v. The 
Government of Israel sentence (HCJ, 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. the Government 
of Israel),  based its decision on the situation of serious threat to national security, posed above 
all by suicide terrorists from the West Bank who, in 2002, they had justified two military 
operations (defensive wall and determined path), resulting in insufficient deterrence measures 
to prevent further attacks. 
The Supreme Court took up the arguments of the government, according to which the 
reasons underlying the construction of the security barrier, designed as a temporary preventive 
measure, were linked to impelling military needs and the need to act to guarantee national 
security, and did not reflect the will to build a political border. Therefore, referring to the 
provisions of arts. 23, lett. g) and 52 of the Hague Convention and of art. 54 of the first protocol 
to the IV Geneva Convention, judged the confiscation of land in the West Bank valid and 
legitimate.  
In relation to the principle of reasonableness, the court has introduced in this decision 
an element that shows the clear propensity to make the "collective security" good prevail over 
the constraints deriving from humanitarian law. It should be noted that, given the minimum 
experience of the judges in the field of military strategy, the opinion of military commanders in 
the field of counter-terrorism measures must enjoy a presumption of strengthened 
reasonableness, which can be disavowed only in the presence of "very convincing evidences". 
The burden of proof is thus weighed on those who see their rights infringed, if not violated, in 
the name of the defense of the state. 
What is to be praised, however, is the construction of a stringent test of proportionality, 
to be adopted for the screening of the legitimacy of prevention measures (GROSS, 2011). 
It runs on three levels: 1) "compatibility test", or an assessment of the suitability of the 
measure to achieve a specific goal; 2) "least harm test", according to which it is necessary to 
ascertain whether among all the measures that are abstractly possible, the one chosen is the 
least invasive; 3) "proportionality test", which provides for the balancing between damages 
caused and benefits pursued. The court also specifies that the last requirement can be 
assessed both on an absolute basis, taking into account damages caused and benefits 
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achieved, and on a relative basis, comparing the measure adopted with another less invasive, 
even if this last allows to reach a lower utility. The measure chosen could in fact be 
disproportionate if another existed which, while guaranteeing less benefits, entailed a 
considerable reduction of the material damages caused. 
Alongside these three sub-tests, however, the court has traditionally recognized the 
presence of "margin of constitutional appreciation", to be related, case by case, to the nature of 
the fundamental right at stake and to the intensity of its limitation, as elements to be considered 
in the light of the nature and substance of the counter-interests places in balance. The court 
can therefore intervene in all cases in which the preventive measure departs significantly from 
the level of guarantee thus identified, showing itself clearly disproportionate to the needs of the 
concrete case. 
On the other hand, the question of legitimate active defense is different, which more 
than all highlights the prevalence accorded by the state of Israel to national security, 
understood as a collective good, with respect to certain individual rights. 
 
7.TERRORISM AND ACTIVE SELF-DEFENSE: TARGETED KILLINGS AND ILLEGITIMATE 
FIGHTERS 
 
After the outbreak of the second Intifada, the national security of the state of Israel was 
put at serious risk especially by the suicide terrorists who hid among innocent civilians. For this 
reason it was widely used the "targeted killing policy", aimed at killing dangerous terrorists 
involved in planning or preparing terrorist attacks (KRETZMER, 2005; GUIORA, 2004; 
GUNNEFLO, 2016; SENN, TROY, 2017; BACHMANN, 2013). 
However, it was strongly criticized because, by affecting a fundamental and inalienable 
right as the one to life, it ran the risk of resolving into an arbitrary killing of innocent subjects, or 
otherwise liable to capture and condemnation following a fair trial. Precisely this kind of relief 
pushed the associations to protect human rights to submit a large number of appeals to the 
Supreme Court, which pronounced for the first time on the legality of this preventive measure 
in 2006, with a decision that has been defined historical: it was the first and only court on the 
international scene to take on the difficult task of assessing the legitimacy of such a method of 
combating terrorism. 
One of the most controversial and therefore interesting points of the decision is the 
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refusal of the court to recognize the category of unlawful combatants, as tertium genus placed 
in a median position between the category of combatants and that of civilians, since neither the 
convention of Hague, nor those of Geneva, allowed to recognize the extremes useful for their 
formal recognition. 
From this it follows that terrorists can be considered "target" only in the presence of 
certain elements: 1) must take part in hostilities using weapons, gathering information or 
putting in place preparatory activities useful for the preparation of an armed attack; 2) 
participation must be "direct". 
This term represents the true watershed to distinguish a legitimate homicide from a war 
crime, which is why the court has dilated on the interpretative criterion to be adopted, stating 
that the "direct" character can not be recognized only in relation to the conduct being the 
material executors, being able to detect those of those who direct, plan or otherwise take the 
decision to launch the armed attack. 
The mere generic support to the terrorist group, the supply of food, money and 
medicines or the help in the preparation of a logistical and strategic analysis are therefore to be 
considered symptomatic elements of an "indirect" participation. However, in the latter 
circumstances, the killings resulting from a targeted attack by the state should be considered 
"incidental or collateral damages". 2) the loss of immunity to be recognized to civilians in the 
event of war lasts only for the time when the subject takes part in the hostilities. It is precisely 
this element that is the most difficult to prove (GROSS, 2001).  
In the light of these arguments, the court concludes that it can not consider the practice 
in question manifestly illegal, as requested by the applicants, but not even permitted in all 
circumstances, at the discretion of the military commanders. Judge Beinish stated that, if the 
measure is used according to the criteria enucleated in the decision and observing the 
provisions of the humanitarian law of war, we are not speaking of human life in an arbitrary 
manner, but of an action that is intended to save human life. The great concern that emerges 
from the long motivation of the Supreme Court is to arrive at a correct balance between 
national security and the rights to life and physical integrity, especially in relation to obligations 
of protection and protection that the state of Israel must observe for the population of the 
occupied territories. (AZOULAY, OPHIR, 2013) 
Because the greatest risk, when it comes to the targeted killing policy, is linked to "false 
positives", or to the killing or improper limitation of rights against those who are unjustly 
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suspected of acts of terrorism, the judges said they no longer wanted be satisfied with an 
approach based on the mere status of the subject, which says nothing about the degree of 
involvement in criminal activity necessary to justify the application of a preventive measure 
(HAKIMI, 2008, MACKEN, 2013), preferring to adopt a new guiding principle, aimed at 
reducing the risk of "damage side". In other words, such a landing marks a strong change of 
perspective, which makes it possible to legitimately resort to extrajudicial measures by 
abandoning the status-based approach in favor of the individual dangerousness doctrine, 
based on specific legal parameters: 1) the measure must have a preventive and non-retributive 
or deterrent purpose; 2) there must be a specific obligation to ascertain the dangerousness of 
the recipient of the preventive measure, based on the seriousness of the facts and the 
threshold of imminence of the attack; 3) the measure must also be the least invasive in the 
rights of the individual. 
The necessary classification between the preventive measures is justified by the 
administrative nature of the intervention, which excludes the guarantees of due process and 
therefore the need to collect suitable evidence to support a certain allegation, the right to be 
heard and that to be judged by a court impartial and condemned when guilt is proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
The decisive test is the second one, aimed at determining whether or not one is facing a 
dangerous terrorist, against whom one can act according to legitimate defense. One can 
voluntarily kill a person only if he is an aggressor. Even in war a soldier can not kill an individual 
if he does not reasonably believe that he is a fighter, just as he can not kill the enemy if it is not 
a threat (HAQUE, 2012). Given the relevance of the interests involved, the probability 
threshold, in such cases, must be close to certainty, since it is morally more costly to kill 
innocents by being a shield with the precautionary principle, compared to suffering a terrorist 
attack due to an assessment error due to a "false negative". The affiliation in a terrorist group is 
an index that must be taken into consideration, as well as any criminal record of the subject, 
but nothing can be worth information regarding past events, also because international law, 
when it refers to "civilians taking part to hostilities", recalls hypotheses in which such subjects 
are directly involved in the planning or execution of a concrete terrorist act. However, these 
assessments are usually left out when it comes to imposing restrictions on a group of subjects 
considered dangerous, because it is considered sufficient that among all its members at least 
one exceeds the level of danger required to act in advance. According to this new doctrine, on 
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the contrary, the executive must first ascertain and demonstrate that the risk comes from the 
group in its entirety, since only in this case the minimum level of danger allowed can be 
considered exceeded. 
The required sub-test, directly connected to the main one of dangerousness, concerns 
the imminence of the threat: in fact, if the possibility to act preventively is admitted, in relation 
to the intensity of the perceived danger and not to the real task of the same, it would allow 
states to implement policies that are dangerous for a rule of law. Under such conditions not 
even the good life could recognize itself a predominant role in the hierarchy of fundamental 
rights (WALZEL, 2006) and the risk is so much higher when one thinks of the tendency, 
especially in the fight against terrorism, to respond emotionally to threats, trying to guarantee 
not only the right to security in its factual dimension, but also in that simply emotional. 
The possible approaches to defining the concept of "imminence" are two: the first 
means imminence as a high risk of verifying the event, while the second one absorbs it in the 
concept of necessity, confusing its physiognomy. However, not even through the "immediate 
necessity standard", adopted by the theory in question as well as by the Israeli jurisprudence, 
which gives importance not to the imminence of the threat, but the immediacy with which we 
must respond to the danger to neutralize it, solve problems related to excessive anticipations 
protection and hyper-trophic interventions of the executive. 
The last requirement that must be met is that of the proportionality of the measure 
adopted which, having to be the least invasive for the rights of the recipient, should lead the 
State to prefer the capture of a terrorist to a drone operation aimed at killing him, as far as the 
second is often less risky than the first. In order to choose the type of measure to be adopted in 
the specific case, it will therefore be necessary to assess, on the one hand, whether the 
benefits obtainable are greater than the collectable side-effects and, on the other hand, what is 
its effectiveness with respect to the risk threshold from the threat, or if the marginal benefit 
achievable is sufficiently high to justify the renunciation of a more burdensome measure. 
This theory allows to anchor particularly invasive measures for human rights to criteria 
of danger in concrete and not only to mere presumptions, for this reason it has been used as a 
paradigm to which also conform the subsequent decisions of the Court, as demonstrated in the 
case concerning the revision of the presumptions of dangerousness contained in the 
internment of unlawful combatants law, n. 5762-2002. (BLANK, NOONE, 2018, CORN, 
HANSEN, JACKSON, 2018) 
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With this law the Knesset (GROSS, 2005, SEGEV, 2007, NAVOT, 2007; MEHOZAY, 
2012; MEDINA, 2013; ADAMS, MEUWESE, HIRSCH BALLIN, 2017) had formally recognized 
the category of unlawful combatants, even if non-existent in international law, to reduce the 
standard of substantial and procedural guarantees to be granted to the subjects deemed to be 
such. 
The rationale of the law is, in fact, to remove such subjects from the circle of hostilities 
conducted by terrorist organizations against the state of Israel. 
According to sect. 3, lett. a) the IDF chief of staff may issue an imprisonment order 
against an unlawful combatant if there are reasonable grounds for believing that his release 
could endanger national security. Section 7 adds that the member of an organized group 
responsible for violent actions against the State or in any case who takes part in such activities 
may be the recipient of such a measure, whether directly or indirectly; he can not be freed until 
at the end of the conflict, unless he can prove, in judgment, the absence of danger. 
In this way, an exceptional but non-emergency regulatory instrument was introduced 
into the legal system which, allowing potentially infinite administrative detention, showed itself 
to be more damaging to the right to personal freedom than the emergency powers (detentions) 
of law of 1979. 
The first, in fact, does not depend on the declaration of the state of national emergency, 
while the second yes; the order of imprisonment in the first case can be issued by the chief of 
staff of the army, with power of delegation to a general, while in the second the intervention of 
the Minister of Defense is necessary; in the first case the authorities have 14 days to bring the 
detainee before a judge, while in the second the maximum term, under penalty of release of 
the detainee, is 48 hours; in the first case, the administrative detention is indefinitely, with a six-
monthly review of the existence of the application conditions and the persistent degree of 
danger of the unlawful combatant, while in the second case the maximum term of detention is 6 
months, with the right to renew and review of the application conditions every 3 months 
(section 2, letter a). 
With the adoption of the law of 2002 there has therefore been an inversion of the 
paradigm of subjective danger due, not only to a reinforced presumption that depends on the 
mere inclusion in a group or indirect support, but also on a burdensome burden of proof in 
relation to the non-dangerousness of the subject, from the fulfillment of which depends the 
cessation of a potentially infinite imprisonment. This evidence, however, is made almost 
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diabolical by the possibility, recognized ex lege, to issue orders of incarceration and submit 
them to judicial review in the absence of the person and his lawyer (whose contacts can be 
prevented up to 7 days after arrest), or on the basis of evidence secreted for national security 
needs, which prevent counter-deductions and allegations of further evidence in favor. 
In light of these assumptions, the internment of unlawful combatants law has been 
criticized by the doctrine, which has highlighted the profiles of unconstitutionality, especially 
because it is disproportionate to the end, given that in law there was already a law suitable to 
prepare preventive protection of the community, and to inhibit a dangerous person, the 
possibility of implementing his criminal plans. 
The Supreme Court, ruling on the point in 2008, with the Iyyad v. State of Israel 
sentence, however, reached completely opposite positions (CrimA, 6659/06 A. v. the State of 
Israel, decision of 11 June 2008). In fact, even though introducing hermeneutical criteria, to 
which the administrative authorities should have conformed, it considered the law 5762-2002 in 
line with section 8 of the basic law: human dignity and liberty and with international forecasts. 
The scope of the law of 2002 was not judged disproportionate, since its ratio was totally 
different from the one that animates the 1979 law. In one case, the goal of the state was to 
keep the foreigner working in the context of a terrorist group, far from the area of hostilities, 
while in the second case the objective was to make a citizen or resident of the state temporarily 
harmless, not necessarily part of a terrorist group, which poses a threat to collective security. 
In relation to the censured presumptions of dangerousness of sect. 3 and 7 of the law of 
2002, the court specified that the state, to prove that a certain individual was an unlawful 
combatant, should first prove that he had made a significant contribution, suitable to prove 
even the subjective danger, which is why negligible or marginal offense, or simple connivance 
with the terrorist group, were not considered sufficient for the purpose of detention. In other 
words, the degree of danger of the terrorist suspect could only be deduced from the type of 
role played in the organization and the nature of its contribution. 
Since the measure in question strongly affects personal freedom, the state will be 
required to provide "clear and convincing evidence" to prove the threat to national security, 
which means that the tests will have to be evaluated in the light of their quantity, quality and 
actuality. The court considered it possible to also take into account the activities of the past for 
the assessment of subjective danger, but specified that a proof relating to a past event could 
not be considered suitable to support an order of imprisonment, especially because the 
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administrative detention is preventive and not it can be used for remuneration purposes. 
In the context of administrative detention, it recognized a fundamental role in secret 
trials, since the essence of the measure is to remove threats from the hostile zone, without 
however affecting the state's intelligence activities. In spite of this, the judges who would have 
had to decide on the basis of material secreted and not accessible to the defense, would have 
had to evaluate with great skill the validity, credibility and value to be given to the tests 
produced (BARAK-EREZ, WAXMAN, 2009). 
From this it follows that the greater the period of administrative detention, the greater 
the burden of proof by the state will be to justify the need to maintain a subject in vinculis, so 
that it will have to request the production of new evidence, not being able anymore perpetuate 
the detention, on the basis of the probative framework previously submitted to the scrutiny of 
the court. 
In light of the findings, the judges considered the forecasts of the combined provisions 
between sections 3 and 7 of the internment of unlawful combatants law in line not only with 
constitutional provisions, but also with the paradigm of the individual dangerousness doctrine 
(ONUSHI 2018). Only after the state has fulfilled its own probative burden with regard to the 
possibility of framing the subject in the category of unlawful combatants, thereby proving, even 
if indirectly, its danger, it may proceed with the reference to the relative presumption of 
persistence. of the threat to national security, which however will lose its intensity with the 
passage of time and the succession of review hearings. 
Despite the “protective nature” approach adopted by the judges in this sentence 
regarding administrative detention, it shows a tendency of opposite sign, which is inclined to 
consider always valid and credible information of intelligence secreted by the state and those 
relating to the danger of the detainee. Moreover, although the judges profess their high skills in 
the assessment of the value of the secret tests, no case of censorship of the executive's work 
was identified with the effect of indirectly reiterating the presumption reinforced on the 
correctness of the assessments of the latter in the field of national security (KREBS, 2012). 
 
8.(FOLLOWS) SECRET PROVES AND TORTURE 
 
A further problem related to the use of the secret tests is that related to their collection 
methods, not always duly considered by the courts, ie the one linked to the use of inhuman and 
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degrading treatments or even torture to obtain a confession to be used in a subsequent 
process. This problem is also closely connected to the time when the prisoner is kept in 
vinculis, without the possibility of being translated before a judge or to make contact with a 
lawyer. 
The state of Israel, in 1991, signed the international covenants for civil and political 
rights, making use of the clause in art. 4 to suspend the provisions of art. 9 which prohibits 
arbitrary arrests (VON DER WENSE, 2013) and in the same way, despite having adhered to 
the 1984 convention against torture, it has always declared itself not bound to the 
recommendations of the relevant committee, even more so for the perennial state of 
emergency that characterizes it. 
The debate on the methods of interrogation used by the general security service (GSS) 
began in the late 1980s, following two scandals involving the Israeli secret services and leading 
to the appointment of a commission of inquiry presided over by Moshe Landau, chief justice of 
the Supreme Court (KREMNITZER, 1989). 
It established that between 1971 and 1986 a massive number of Palestinians were 
subjected to torture to obtain confessions to be used before the military courts, that the 
physical abuses perpetrated followed the crystallized procedures in the secret and internal 
guidelines of the GSS and that those who had the task of carrying out the interrogations, to 
ensure the admissibility of the confession extorted, consistently arose before the judges in 
relation to the acts of torture carried out against the prisoner. Considering these established 
abuses, in its final report, the commission examined three possible alternatives: 1) to recognize 
an absolute state of exception, allowing the secret services to conduct the fight against 
terrorism outside the law; 2) adopt a hypocritical solution to the problem, expressly reiterating 
the absolute prohibition of torture and continuing to conceal what actually happens in practice; 
3) find a solution that takes into account all the interests at stake and the needs related to the 
defense of the community. 
It adhered to the third solution, stating that the GSS should always prefer a non-violent 
conduct of interrogations, but granting the right to proceed with a "moderate physical pressure" 
in extreme cases, or in all cases where it would be possible to recall favor of the state of 
necessity. This conclusion was ratified by parliament, despite criticism from international 
human rights organizations, and was implemented in practice against all those captured during 
the first Intifada (FELLER, 1989). 
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This conclusion was ratified by the parliament, despite criticism from international 
human rights organizations, and was implemented in practice against all those captured during 
the first Intifada (KRETZMER, 2012; DILLMAN, BAKRI, 1991; NAVOT, 2014; BEN-NAFTALI, 
2011; DOTAN, 2004; DERSHOWITZ, 1989). 
In a panel of nine judges, the court analyzed the appeals of seven detainees who, on 
the one hand, denounced the lack of a legislative provision granting the members of GSS the 
power to conduct interrogations and, on the other hand, alleged to have been subjected to the 
methods of interrogation authorized by the landau commission, defined as illegal, since they 
were verging on real torture. 
The state, on the contrary, deduced that the competence to investigate crimes that put 
at risk national security derived from sect. 40 of the basic law: the government and by art. 2, 
par. 1 of the code of criminal procedure, and that the methods of interrogation used by the 
secret services could not be considered either torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, since 
they were not suitable for causing pain or psychological suffering. Lastly, the state pointed out 
that the use of moderate physical violence was nevertheless lawful according to national law, 
given the necessity defense of sect. 34, par. 11 of the criminal code. 
The judges established that the members of GSS had to be legally recognized as public 
officials and therefore authorized to carry out any kind of investigative activity, within the limits 
of the provisions of art. 2, par. 1 of the code of criminal procedure. 
Furthermore, given that during an interrogation fundamental rights such as physical and 
mental freedom, privacy and above all personal dignity are seriously threatened, they 
vigorously affirmed that the right to use violent methods could be granted only through an 
ordinary, compatible law with the sect. 8 of the basic law: human dignity and liberty. For this 
reason, the directives internal to GSS, as claimed by the State as guidelines, because of 
administrative nature, could not be valid as an express authorization clause, and therefore the 
methods used in the seven cases under appeal should be considered illegal and in the future 
prohibited, as they incur unreasonably and disproportionately on the dignity of the individual. 
The "moderate physical pressure", in the opinion of the government, had to be 
considered legitimately usable in extreme cases, or in"ticking time bomb situations", due to the 
reference to the state of necessity to be interpreted as an ex ante authorization, suitable to 
recognize space also to torture, if deemed necessary in relation to the intensity of the danger to 
be neutralized. 
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The judges, taking note of this position, which was in line with that of the landau 
commission, and while considering the reference to the correct sect. 34, par. 11, as a common 
reminder applicable also to the agents of the state, still recognized the reading offered by the 
unfair resistors. 
The necessity defense could not be interpreted as a source of law, since it was 
designed to be applied post-factum, in order to avoid that a subject, who acts in exceptional 
situations to resist unpredictable threats, is liable to incrimination. If therefore an official of GSS 
had acted outside the limits established in the law would have been liable to incrimination, ex 
art. 277 of the criminal law 1977,  unless he could prove that, in the concrete case, all the 
elements constituting the state of necessity existed. 
The Court, however, on this point, made a concession that made the whole system of 
the motivation fall foul, or recognized only the attorney general the power to outline guidelines 
aimed at illustrating in which cases it was always possible to recognize the presence of the 
typical elements of the state of necessity. 
The sentence ended with the concurring opinion of judge Kedmi who, while adhering to 
the setting of the other eight judges, proposed that this decision be suspended for a year, a 
period in which GSS could continue to use extraordinary methods of interrogation in case of 
"ticking bombs" and the Knesset should have assumed the burden of approving a law 
regulating permissible interrogation techniques, in light of the obligation to guarantee the safety 
of the community and the integrity of the state. 
The decision was accepted by the public as a new attack on national security, while the 
doctrine welcomed it, considering it as a triumph of human rights over the abuses of the 
executive (CLARK, 2001). But, at a more in-depth analysis, the motivations of the Supreme 
Court appear in many ways to be criticized. 
On the one hand, the opportunity has been lost to scrutinize all the interrogation 
practices generally used, given that the judges decided not to issue an order of performance, 
even if closed, of the guidelines of the secret services and, on the other hand, the ruling took 
into consideration only the work of the latter and not that of police officers, focusing on 
interrogations but not on the time between arrest and the latter. (IMSEIS, 2001; DAVIS, 
MCGARRITY, WILLIAMS, 2014; JAMES, SHELTON, JAMES ANAYA, 2017) 
Moreover, the position taken by the supreme judges has strong political connotations 
and reveals the strong pressure exerted by the military establishment and the executive.  
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The court, in fact, did not affirm an absolute prohibition against torture but, on the 
contrary, preferred to "play with labels" by recognizing legitimacy spaces for the use of 
"moderate physical pressure", without ever defining how such a formula, potentially 
omnicomprehensive, should be interpreted. In fact, it has adopted an ex post legitimation 
position, which is based on the possibility of making use of the state of necessity in extreme 
cases, while leaving open the possibility of introducing an ex-ante authorization, of a legislative 
nature, on the model of torture warrants (DERSHOWITZ, 2004; PERRY, WHITE, 2004). 
Moreover, although the ruling has repeatedly stressed the need to intervene by means of 
ordinary law on interrogation practices, thus recalling the opportunity to open a public debate in 
the place of greater democratic representation, such as parliament, in the final part of the 
motivation seems to perceive a contradiction in terms. 
Considering possible the ex ante formulation of guidelines on the state of necessity by 
the attorney general, the already uncertain structure of the sentence is undermined, since 
indirectly the possibility of exercise of moderate physical pressure on the basis of indications, 
of a source even sub-regulation, which are designed to secure GSS from charges, acting as a 
presumption in court. The latter, accompanied by a reinforced presumption of good faith in the 
choices of the executive in matters of security, makes it at least difficult to put an end to the 
practices censored by the Court and, on the other hand, to open proceedings against those 
who they abuse their authority, being able to overcome the problem of the fallacy related to the 
incorrect interpretation of the factual premises that allow to situate the situation in those typical 
of the ticking bomb theory. 
This last term, moreover, has been left to the full discretion of the agent, thus opening 
up further important problems of interpretation, including the degree of imminence of the 
danger suitable to justify torture (the duration of the ticking), the degree of involvement of the 
subject in the criminal plane, the intensity of the threat and the number of potential victims. 
These elements, while basing the screening of proportionality necessary to decide whether to 
torture or not a prisoner, are based only on mere conjectures or simple hypotheses and can be 
polluted by the effect of the "trap of fixed ideas", a situation in which those who question a 
suspect are so convinced of the fact that the latter has relevant information, to lose the ability 
to objectively evaluate conflicting indicators. In other words, no one can convince those who 
question the uselessness of torture if he believes that the suspect has not provided all the 
information in his possession (GROSS, 2006). 
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The theory was advanced that the Supreme Court felt the need to call into question the 
Knesset to regulate this kind of situations, in the belief that a law authorizing the use of torture, 
or at least inhuman and degrading treatments, would never was judged to conform to the 
democratic character of the state, as reiterated in sect. 8 of basic law: human dignity and 
liberty, and therefore considered unconstitutional. (WEINBLUM, 2015) 
However, this theory never had the chance to find a practical meeting. The proposed 
bill, in fact, was not approved by virtue of immorality and intolerability, for a democratic country 
like Israel, to include in a national law an authorization to use "moderate physical pressure". 
Another reason that made parliament desist was linked to the loss of effectiveness of the 
interrogations, since when the techniques that can be used and the conditions in which it would 
be possible to resort to violent methods had been crystallized into a law, any terrorist would 
have had the possibility to predict the degree of pressure to which it could legitimately be 
exposed. By eliminating the variables of fear and uncertainty, the possibility of surrender of the 
inmate would also be eliminated. 
A law of similar scope would also have to clarify the model of coordination between 
substantive law (sect. 34, par. 11 of the criminal code) and the procedural one. Section 12, lett. 
a, of evidence ordinance 1971, in the matter of confession, specifies that the latter can be 
considered admissible in court only if the public prosecutor annexes the evidence intended to 
demonstrate the manner in which it was obtained, and the court considers that it is free and 
voluntary. 
At this point, it is not clear at all that the utility can be perceived by admitting the use of 
physical and psychological pressure on the suspect, if the confession is considered 
inadmissible, even if at the discretion of the court. If torture, under certain conditions, is 
considered lawful, why should the product thereof be unusable? (GROSS, 2001). 
The parliament, taking note of the nature and quantity of problems to be faced, 
preferred to intervene in more general terms by renouncing to reduce the powers of the 
executive and confirming its tendency to consider national security as the prevailing legal 
interest. The assembly therefore decided to approve the general security service law 5762-
2002 (NAVOT, 2003; AURIER, BEAUD, WEILMAN, 2018) with which, on the one hand, the 
powers of the secret services were regulated for the first time and, on the other hand, a semi-
immunity was introduced for those who they deal with interrogating terrorism suspects. Section 
18 provides, in fact, that a member of GSS cannot be accused in a civil or criminal proceeding 
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for an action or omission, committed in good faith and according to reasonableness, in the 
exercise of his functions. 
Another targeted intervention, made necessary not only as a reaction to the Supreme 
Court ruling, but also as a countermeasure to avoid the presence of lawyers during the 
interrogations, was the amendment to the criminal procedures law (interrogation of suspects) 
with which an obligation to proceed to video-recording of the latter, which, however, is still not 
fulfilled, given the decision by Knesset to delay its entry into force until 2015. 
The ruling in question has not therefore reduced the abuses of the secret services on 
prisoners, but, on the contrary, has created a legal mechanism of immunity which they can use, 
protecting them from criminal proceedings. According to estimates by the public committee 
against torture in Israel, from the time the Supreme Court decision was made public in 2006, 
more than 500 exhibits were reported with which they were reported torture suffered during the 
interrogations and from which they arose only few disciplinary proceedings. 
The use of the internal regulations of GSS as an interrogation manual, which is still 
secret today, was indirectly confirmed by the Prime Minister Olmert who, in 2007, affirmed that 
the internal guidelines that provide consultation systems with high-ranking officers, preventive 
to the use of extraordinary interrogation techniques, meet the requirements required by the 
state of need. With this assertion, on the one hand, the distorted interpretation of the 
discriminating one is reaffirmed, as a preventive authorization to the use of violence and, on 
the other hand, a dysfunctionality is introduced into the legal system, which makes it possible 
to declassified hypotheses of torture, from crimes with a simple administrative offense. 
Although the Supreme Court, in its 1999 ruling, upheld an ex post model of 
legitimization for the use of moderate physical strength, the reality shows that in practice there 
are already "torture warrants", in favor of which Dershovitz had already established. 
(DERSHOWITZ, 2003; DERSHOVITZ, 2003) 
In November 2008, the "necessity procedure" was again submitted to the court, but the 
appeal was declared inadmissible, since the factual basis and the attached evidence were 
insufficient, despite the fact that the government had already expressly admitted the existence 
of a meticulously regulated procedure and, in his opinion, fully in line with the 
recommendations made in the 1999 decision. 
The picture just outlined is further exacerbated by the lack of guarantees in favor of 
torture victims, who discount the inefficiency of an investigative mechanism entrusted to a 
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conniving body, rather than an independent one. The appeals are in fact addressed to the 
department of GSS in charge of internal investigations, in the person of the officer in charge of 
investigating interrogees' complaints, also a member of the secret services, who is required to 
submit a preliminary report on the allegations to the attorney general, which decides whether to 
proceed with a criminal action, or to file the case. (GROSS, 2001) 
The decision is therefore left to the one who is directly responsible for the preparation of 
guidelines on matters of necessity and can be censured by the Supreme Court only in the 
presence of an ad hoc appeal, and especially only in the event that the conclusions of attorney 
general are manifestly unreasonable. As can be easily seen, from this mechanism emerges a 
vicious circle that makes impunity the rule and punishment only a rare exception. 
 
9.CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
When the "state of exception" is considered, as a concept-limit or threshold of the 
system, one enters a space marked by a strong mix of law and politics, in which states are 
allowed to suspend certain rights and guarantees for the time necessary to overcome an 
emergency. However, this power does not undermine the validity of the rules, but only their 
application. 
In relation to the latter requirement, the intervention of the parliament seems to be 
indispensable, since only a representative political body can validly assume responsibility for 
declaring the state of emergency and its duration. Furthermore, the derogating legislation 
should be provided with a justification, giving an account of its necessity, of the suitability for 
the purpose and of the impact on fundamental rights. In this way, the courts would have to 
evaluate the specific case, which is concentrated above all on the principle of proportionality. 
The latter, in fact, assumes an important role as a canon of criminal politics, but becomes 
decisive as a hermeneutical criterion. 
What represents a "weak link" in the definition of a systematic of the emergency, 
especially in relation to a possible future terrorist attack is the requirement of the "imminence" 
of the threat. The absence of guidelines capable of defining the scope of this concept 
introduces deep criticism given the trend, which is developing at an international level, to 
consider this phenomenon as an "armed attack", ie as a suitable fact to justify an answer in the 
framework of legitimate defense, as per art. 51 Charter, UN. (VENTURA, 2018; RUYS, 2010). 
48 
 
 
ISSN nº  2359-0106                                                  Vol. 6,  n.1, 2019.  
 
 Vol. 06 n. 1.  2019 
Considering these premises, it can be concluded that terrorism is certainly a 
phenomenon that creates an alarm but it is not an emergency in the proper sense, which is 
why it should not be a suitable condition for the creation of a "state of exception". Observing 
the responses to the security issues linked to the terrorist phenomenon given by some states, 
there was a strong convergence towards prevention and anticipation of protection. The first, in 
particular, has led to disproportionate enlargements of investigative powers, with the risk of 
introducing constant control over the entire population, while the latter has suffered from some 
shortcomings related to the typing technique. In particular, a lack of certainty came to light, use 
of presumptions on the basis of evidence and risks related to the divergence between specific 
intent and suitability of the conduct. These distortions, however, have been attenuated thanks 
to the intervention of Supreme Courts and legitimacy, which have proved to have an important 
role in defining the norm that the interpreter will be called upon to apply. 
It is therefore indispensable, on the one hand, to arrive at the definition of the 
phenomenon and, on the other hand, to identify a worthy interest for protection that can be 
interpreted unequivocally by the different member states. In this regard one could recall the 
"ideal collective security"-understood as the integrity of the State and its infrastructures-as an 
intermediary legal asset with respect to "material collective security", a final good intended in 
the sense of physical integrity of the population. The collective security in its two meanings, as 
a legal asset protected by future minimum prosecutions at European level, would facilitate their 
transposition into the individual national laws and would also affect the technique of formulating 
the criminal case, allowing to establish, already at supranational level, a common punishment 
threshold, especially in relation to forms of anticipation of protection. A "good" legislative 
technique, in fact, would probably have favorable effects also in terms of procedural law and 
that of prevention of terrorism, and could at the same time encourage better judicial 
cooperation between states, ensuring, during the phase of the ascertainment of crimes, of the 
uniform standards of guarantees in favor of the accused. 
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